TRUTH ABOUT INDIA’s FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Part VI)- DEVELOPMENTS AFTER WW II AND TRANSFER OF POWER (1945-1947)

 TRUTH ABOUT INDIA’s FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Part VI)

  12.5 DEVELOPMENTS AFTER WW II AND TRANSFER OF POWER (1945-1947)

(by Ved Pal, IRSE; FIE; FIPWE; MBA; Former Principal Chief Engineer and Former Chief Administrative Officer, Ministry of Rlys, Govt of India)

Introduction: We have been fed a narrative by official Historians about freedom struggle of India. The last phase of freedom struggle from 1942 to 1947 was most crucial and that was most fudged one concealing real facts. Half-truths and even blatant lies have been fed in the name of history. This concluding part of freedom struggle has been compiled based upon following authentic primary documents listed after narrating how extremely crucial documents were destroyed and many other vital ones not yet declassified.

During the transfer of power (1946–47), both the British and Indian governments destroyed or withheld some official records, though in different ways and at different times. On the British side, there were ad-hoc destructions in India in 1946–47, including open burning of files in New Delhi at the time of the handover, a fact later acknowledged in declassified Foreign Office papers and contemporary press summaries; these episodes were sufficiently conspicuous that later officials warned such practices should not be repeated (reported from released FCO material in The Times of India, 29 Nov 2013). Subsequently, the British government institutionalized concealment and destruction through a formal program later known as 'Operation Legacy', carried out mainly in the 1950s–1970s under the Foreign/Colonial Office, targeting “embarrassing” or sensitive colonial files; the existence and scope of this program are documented in the UK National Archives (FCO 141, “migrated archives”). On the Indian side, while large bodies of 1942–47 policy records were opened in phases after Independence, significant categories, especially intelligence and security files, were never fully declassified, and some wartime/transfer-era records were weeded or destroyed under routine records-management rules, leaving no comprehensive public tally of losses (National Archives of India practice; reflected by gaps noted alongside the published India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47). Besides that, letters exchanged between Jawaharlal Nehru and Edwina Mountbatten (Historians Philip Ziegler, Von Tunzelmann, Philip Ziegler and above all Nicholas Mansergh in editorial commentary referenced indirectly in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VI, have stated that there had been exchange of a large number of letters between Nehru and Edwina Mountbatten during 1946-48. One letter of 7 November1946 has been specifically quoted in last sub-para of para 12.5.5), along with personal diaries of Lord and Lady Mountbatten, which are part of the Broadlands Archive held by the University of Southampton (UK) might also prove to be explosive. In 2022 a UK tribunal refused to order full public disclosure of documents (including Nehru’s correspondence with Edwina) finding that releasing them could prejudice UK relations with other states and involve private information about the British Royal Family and living individuals and were not subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act. Also In 2024, members of India’s Prime Minister’s Museum and Library (formerly the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, NMML)  wrote to Rahul Gandhi seeking the return or digitization of 51 cartons of Nehru’s personal letters (including those to Edwina Mountbatten) that were allegedly removed from public access in 2008 at the request of Congress leader Sonia Gandhi. All these destroyed/concealed documents could have revealed the real truth which could be far more explosive. Following are primary documents on which this study is based. Page numbers may vary as many classified documents have been declassified in time period spread over many decades and different editions may have different page numbers for same quote. British government declassified documents related to Transfer of Power in multiple waves, initially some documents under the 30-year rule (1950s–60s), then during HMSO publication (1970–83), and later under the 20-year rule. Approximately 3,000 documents were printed in Transfer of Power from a much larger open corpus. This section has been compiled, duly giving references, mainly from following sources:

1. The Transfer of Power, 1942–47 (digitized) CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA ‘THE TRANSFER OF POWER 1942-7’ Volumes VI to XI . Editor-in-Chief NICHOLAS MANSERGH, Litt.D., F.B.A. Fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge) and E. W. R. Lumby; LONDON HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE © Crown Copyright 1982, First published 1982, isbn 0 11 580086 7, Printed in England for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office by Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd, Thanet Press, Margate, Kent.  These include most of the day-to-day official papers and the key letters are reproduced in the official multi-volume documentary series India. These will be referred as “TOP, 1942-47”

2. Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) Files, 1912-1950 Published by IDC Publishers (IDC Publishers was a Netherlands-based academic publishing and microform company, internationally known for producing and distributing primary-source research collections, especially in microfilm and microfiche formats, for historians and social scientists. It was active mainly from the 1960s through the early 2000s and in the early 2000s, it merged with Chadwyck-Healey), 2000 (Originals held by: British Library, Oriental & India Office Collections (OIOC). Indian Political Intelligence was a secret organization within the India Office in London, charged with keeping watch on the activities of Indian subversives (communists, terrorists and nationalists) operating outside India. It reported to the Secretary of State for India through the India Office's Public & Judicial Department, and to the Government of India through the Intelligence Bureau of the Home Department. It worked in close collaboration with the British Government's Security Service (MI.5) and Secret Intelligence Service i.e. MI.6).

3. Primary material in Admiralty / C-in-C (Auchinleck) papers and contemporary trial pamphlets (Red Fort (Internet Archive+2kar.kent.ac.uk+2).

4. The Royal Air Force Museum incorporated by Royal Charter (RC000922) and is a charity registered in England and Wales (1197541); Section: Mutiny. This will be referred as “RAF museum records”.

5. “Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck” Author-John Connell, Edition 2, Publisher- Cassell, 1959. This will be referred as “Auchinleck’s Biography.”

6. Research paper by Dr. Harkirat Singh published in HISTORICITY RESEARCH JOURNAL Volume - 4 | Issue - 7 | marcH - 2018 TITLED “THE INA TRIAL: A CHALLENGE TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE RAJ”. It will be referred as “Research paper by Dr. Harkirat Singh”

 

12.5.1 INA Trials and its Fallout (1945-1946) 

12.5.1.1 INA Trials: The personnel of the INA who fell in the hands of British in Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Imphal fronts were brought to India and detained at Red Fort. The India Office in London asked the British Government of India to formulate a policy towards the Indian soldiers who had joined the INA. The Government of India formulated a policy towards INA and issued a communique declaring that the offence going over to the enemy and fighting against his former comrades was most serious that a soldier could commit and punishable with death by the law of all countries. These men would be tried by court martial. The Government thought it wise to try the officers to prove their guilt before the public and world at large and hence decided to hold the trials of the INA officers at Red Fort at New Delhi. By open trial at a historic public place British wanted to give a strong message to public, in general and Defense Forces in particular, that any uprising against them would be dealt with heavy hand. They either presumed support from Congress; as is evident from this extract “Congress leaders had consistently disavowed any association with the enemy, and it was assumed that they would not support those who had served under Japanese auspices” (India Office internal assessment, late 1945, Transfer of Power, Vol. VI, p. 1076), or there might have been some covert assurance from some leaders, record of which might have got destroyed as mentioned in introduction. In this connection Nehru’s statement in Gauhati in 1942 to fight Subhas, and Nehru’s letter to Auchinlck (both quoted verbatim in para12.5.1.2 Political Opportunity for Congress) can serve as pointers. Crucially, after unrest erupted, officials admitted the assumption was wrong: “It was a serious error to suppose that previous Congress attitudes towards the INA would determine public reaction to the trials.” (India Office minute, February 1946 (Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, p. 241).

Soon the public learnt how the Indian National Army had been formed and grew, how many of its men were presently being held in the various forts, camps and prisons of India, how many were to be charged and tried.

On 5th Nov 1945, first public trial (court-martiall) of INA officers, notably Shah Nawaz Khan, P. K. Sahgal and Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, began at Red Fort, New Delhi. The three officers were all regular holders of the King’s commission. The senior most was Captain Shah Nawaz of the 1/14 Punjab Regiment, a former winner of the Sword of Honor at the Indian Military Academy, who had held the rank of ‘major- general’ in the I.N.A. and had commanded a division in Burma in 1945. Other two were Captain P. K. Sahgal of the 2/10 Baluch Regiment and Lieutenant G. S. Dhillon, of the 1/14. Punjab Regiment who had been battalion commanders in Shah Nawaz’s division. All three were charged with murder abetment of murder, and waging war against the King-Emperor.

The trial was adjourned and recommenced on 21 November. On this date there were angry and violent protests against their prosecution. There were clashes with the military and police in many cities and several protesters were killed and injured. The Indians in all the wings of colonial government’s armed forces expressed resentment in some form or the other. Most of the Indian officers were against prosecution of INA soldiers. While proceedings were going on, the agitation for the release of INA men intensified. These agitations acquired serious proportions even snowballing into mutiny that went out of control and forced Britishers to leave India. Following primary sources indicate that Britishers left India because of fallout of INA trials and imminent full-scale mutiny by Indian armed forces, rather than due to Congress:

Clement Attlee’s Confession: During Clement Attlee’s visit to Calcutta around 15^th March 1946, the issue arose in discussion with the Governor of Bengal, Richard Gardiner Casey, at a moment when the British Cabinet had just begun formal preparations for constitutional transfer in the aftermath of the INA trials and the Royal Indian Navy revolt. In this context, Casey asked Attlee what factors had chiefly compelled Britain to decide to quit India, and in particular whether Congress pressure had been decisive. Attlee replied that Congress agitation had played only a limited role, and that the decisive factor was the British Government’s loss of confidence in the loyalty of the Indian armed forces after the INA episode and the subsequent spread of unrest in the Services, which made continued imperial rule unenforceable. This exchange is recorded by P. B. Chakrabarty, who at the time was a senior Indian civil servant closely associated with the Bengal Governor’s administration and later became Governor of West Bengal after Independence; his memoir thus reflects a first-hand administrative recollection of Attlee’s explanation, written with the perspective of an official who observed the transition from late colonial rule to post-1947 governance (P. B. Chakrabarty, As I Remember, Orient Longman, 1968, pp. 28–29).

 

Tuker’s Memoir: Lt-Gen. Francis Tuker, who was Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Command (1944–46) and one of the most senior British officers directly responsible for Indian Army security during the INA crisis, wrote in his contemporary memoir: “While the I.N.A. affair was at its most acute, threatening to tumble down the whole edifice of the Indian Army … It was alarming for the future, for the only person who could have got at them was some Indian officer employed on the Staff.” (While Memory Serves: The Story of the Last Two Years of British Rule in India, Cassell, London, 1950, ch. III “A Personal Approach”, pp. 44 and 48).

Secret Military Documents: In a handwritten Confidential War Staff memorandum on ‘Internal Security and Emergency Planning, 1945’ during early October 1945 “Commander-in-Chief, India (Claude Auchinleck) wrote: “It may be necessary to arrange the rapid concentration of European and selected Indian civilians requiring protection in defended areas, which would probably be based on the principal protected airfields.” (India Office Records, IOR/L/WS/1/716 (BL catalogue; 7^th Oct. 1945). However, this was not fully reproduced in Transfer of Power pdf hence TOP only contains “In the event of a serious deterioration of the internal situation it may be necessary to concentrate Europeans and other non-combatants at defended localities. Certain airfields would inevitably become key points in any such dispositions.” (TOP Vol. VI, p. 141). Auchinleck further wrote during 28–30 Nov 1945: “Contingency plans require the identification of defended localities and priority protection of European and other civilians at specified posts (airfields and defended towns).” (Transfer of Power, Vol. VI, pp. 756–757, Auchinleck minute / War Staff file L/WS/1/982).

These are very significant documents which reveal that topmost British Military brass was sensing revolt by Indian defense forces on INA issue, hence made contingency plan to flee India in similar way like US military fled Afghanistan in August 2022, but Congress gave them a very decent and dignified continuation sharing power with them.

 

12.5.1.2 Political Opportunity for Congress: Only serious attempt of Congress in the form of ‘Quit India Movement’ of 1942 had fizzled out with arrest/detention of all prominent Congress leaders. After the release of the Congress leaders from prison in the middle of 1945, the political atmosphere of the country was dull and they had no political program ready at hand to rejuvenate the country. The INA’s attempt to achieve India’s Independence by force had been at variance with the policy of peaceful and non-violent means hence at this stage Congress became irrelevant. To remain relevant Congress had to tow line of masses. The trial of the INA prisoners proved a boon for the Congress party. For more than one reason it appeared that by taking up the cause of the INA officers, the Congress would get an opportunity to organize an All-India nationalist front against the British and here was a ready-made issue. The INA symbolized a revolution against foreign rule. The Congress high command estimated that by defending the INA officers the it could achieve its objective of reviving the revolutionary fervor in the country. So Congress decided to defend the prisoners in the Court and assigned the task to a veteran lawyer, Bhulabhai Desai. Other leaders also supported them in various ways, including in legal defense. In a private interview, Asaf Ali argued that public feelings had forced the Congress to this line of action. (Transfer of Power, 1942-47 declassified documents, vol.6, p. 378). The Congress was merely following public sentiments in its support for the INA. Other political parties in the country viz. the Akali Dal, the Hindu Mahasabha the Muslim League and the Socialist Party etc also came out in support of the INA. The Akali Dal, mainly because a considerable part of the INA hailed from the Punjabi Sikh Community. Sir Norman Smith, the Director of Intelligence Bureau, in a confidential note to Home Department said, “there has seldom a matter which was attracted so much Indian public interest……The effect the publications in question have is undoubted, for many of them are most popular and widely-read even in the rural area. The country’s ear has largely been captured.” (Fay, Peter Ward, op. cit., p. 484) The general ‘Nationalist Press’ was encouraging that clamor marvelously. The Hindustan times and Amrita Bazar Patrika were particularly keen on idealizing the INA. While proceedings were going on, the agitation for the release of INA men intensified. The trials produced huge nationwide sympathy and mass protests which severely damaged British prestige.

Bhulabhai Desai said, “If things are going now it may lead to armed revolution.” (Auchinleck’s Biography pp. 802-803).  Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel said “Does he not know that Subhas Chandra Bose organized an army of 60,000 and a women’s brigade in under a year? It is this very army the British Government is trying to disband now.” If the British were serious about giving India her independence, why did they not make “the Indian National Army the nucleus of the army to be?” (The Hindu, 2 November 1945).

The Director of the Intelligence Bureau observed in a confidential note to the Home Department, “At most of the 160 political meetings held in the central provinces during the first half of October, demands were made for the abandonment of action against the INA.” (Page. 450; “The Forgotten Army” by Fay, Peter Ward, 1994). Position was more or less the same in other provinces also.

Jawaharlal Nehru’s role was very peculiar towards INA. During an interview at Gauhati on 24th April 1942 Nehru was asked about Subhas Bose and what he stated is quoted verbatim- “I shall also fight Mr. Subhas Bose and his party along with Japan if he comes to India” (reported in Amrita Bazar Patrika, 26 April 1942). This text is reproduced in the Nehru Archive / Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, First Series, Vol. 12, pp. 262–63. He confirmed the same three years later as can be seen from following extract from Biography of Auchinleck: “Nehru’s part in it was important. After the breakdown of the Simla conference he went off to have a holiday in Kashmir, where ‘he spent a month on a trek to the higher regions and passes, amid the glaciers and snow, and returned to India exhilarated in heart and spirits’… On August 19, however, he was in Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and when he was interviewed there and asked his views about the I.N.A. he replied: “I was of the opinion and am still of the opinion that the leaders and others of this Army had been misguided in many ways and had failed to appreciate the larger consequences of their unfortunate association with the Japanese. Three years ago I was asked in Calcutta what I would do if Subhas Bose led an army into India on the plea of liberating India. I replied that I would not hesitate to resist this invasion” (AUCHINLECK: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck COB G.GieEe, Sle, DiSOr OB, LI.D, By John Connell). At the Red Fort INA trials Jawaharlal Nehru’s appearance in barrister’s gown.

Several close associates and family members of Subhas Chandra Bose described Jawaharlal Nehru’s appearance at the INA trials as politically opportunistic, explicitly contrasting it with Nehru’s 1942 declaration. Dwijendra Nath Bose (son of Subhas’s eldest brother Sudhir and a freedom fighter. He along with his brother Arabinda and first cousins Sisir and Ila had played a crucial part in Subhash Bose’s dramatic escape from Kolkata in 1941. He was subsequently arrested and subjected to torture by British Government, which left him partially crippled for the rest of his life), writing to the Shah Nawaz Khan Committee (1956), accused Nehru of betrayal and opportunism, stating that Nehru’s later identification with the INA was inconsistent with his wartime stance: “He (Nehru) had betrayed Netaji after having promised to help him… In 1942, in a public meeting Sri Nehru had publicly said that he would be the first Indian to take up his sword to fight Netaji unto death if he entered India.” (Dwijendra Nath Bose to Shah Nawaz Khan Committee, 5 July 1956, Shah Nawaz Committee Papers, Netaji Papers (MEA); cited and reproduced in declassified Netaji files and discussed in contemporary analyses of the Committee record). C. N. Nambiar, who served as Bose’s representative in Europe, wrote scathingly about Congress leaders “Those who had denounced Subhas Bose as a traitor during the war now rushed to wrap themselves in the INA flag when it became popular.” (A. C. N. Nambiar, Netaji: A Biography for the Young / later memoir essays,1970s, passages dealing with the INA trials and Congress response). Sisir Bose (nephew and aide-de-camp of Subhas Bose), who remained deeply critical of Congress wartime policy, described the Congress leadership’s Red Fort stance as a calculated political move rather than a moral conversion: “The Congress, which had condemned Netaji’s path during the war, found it expedient after 1945 to identify itself with the INA, whose popularity had become overwhelming.” (Sisir K. Bose, writings and interviews collected in Netaji and India’s Freedom (later essays; 1970s–1980s). Pro-INA and Forward Bloc writers in the late 1940s repeatedly argued that Nehru’s 1942 Gauhati interview was irreconcilable, in their view, with his 1945 Red Fort symbolism, and therefore evidence of opportunism rather than principle.

Let me also reproduce extracts of letter written by Nehru to Field Marshall Claude Auchinleck, the C-in-C of British Indian Army in 1946.

“Simla, 4 May 1946

Dear Sir Claude,

I want to thank you for your decision to withdraw all trials of I.N.A. personnel. ….  It did not strike me at all at the time that political advantage could be taken of this affair. Then a strange and surprising thing happened, not strange in itself but very surprising because of its depth and extent. Though I had sensed the mood of the Indian people, I had not fully realized how far it went in this direction. Within a few weeks the story of the I.N.A. had percolated to the remotest villages in India and everywhere there was admiration for them and apprehension as to their possible fate. No political organization, however strong and efficient, could have produced this enormous reaction in India. It was one of those rare things which just fit into the mood of the people, reflect as it were, and provide an opportunity for the public to give expression to that mood. The reason for this was obvious. Individuals were not known nor were many facts known to the public. The story as it developed seemed to the people just another aspect of India’s struggle for independence and the individuals concerned became symbols in the public mind. Whether one agrees with this or not, one should at least understand how things happen and what forces lie behind them. The widespread popular enthusiasm was surprising enough, but even more surprising was a similar reaction of a very large number of regular Indian Army officers and men. Something had touched them deeply. This kind of thing is not done and cannot be done by politicians or agitators or the like. It is this fundamental aspect of the I.N.A. question that has to be borne in mind. All other aspects, however important, are secondary.

I suppose everyone who has given thought to the matter realizes fully that it is a dangerous and risky business to break the discipline of an army. It would obviously be harmful to do any injury to a fine instrument like the Indian Army, and yet at every step, till major changes take place converting it into a real national army, we have to face the political issue which governs every aspect of Indian life today. Risks have to be taken sometimes, more especially when existing conditions are felt to be intolerable. You will forgive me for writing this rather long letter. It was my intention only to thank you; but then I felt that I should say something also on this subject, something that might give you a glimpse into my own mind.

Sincerely yours,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU”

 (AUCHINLECK A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck COB G.GieEe, Sle, DiSOr OB, LI.D, BY JOHN CONNELL, page 818-819) . From this letter it is not clear in what capacity he wrote to C-in-C of British Army, what was the purpose. He is talking about political advantage, expressing surprise over reaction of a very large number of regular Indian Army officers and men and calling it dangerous and risky business to break the discipline of fine instrument like the Indian Army. Whether it was an explanation for something or some suggestion, but it raises doubts as to on whose side covertly Nehru was.

  By taking up the defense of the INA, Nehru could create radical image of himself as a fighter for freedom, rather than as a mere politician. The whole of the Congress was to inherit this legacy of the INA and to bring to perfection what the INA had not been able to complete. By placing the INA issue together with Quit India campaign at center stage of its election campaign (1945–46 provincial legislative assembly elections described in more details in para 12.5.2), the Congress could depict an image of active struggle and patriotic self-sacrifice. (Research paper by Dr. Harkirat Singh)

 

12.5.1.3. Civil Disturbances: The trial of INA officers and soldiers at Delhi’s Red Fort aroused such strong sentiments among the Indians against the British that the INA and its main officers became known in every home in the country. The trial of the INA leaders and soldiers re-energized the nationalist political atmosphere in India to feverish pitch. The common people protested in thousands and lakhs all over India, fighting pitched battle with the government forces and getting injured and even losing their lives. The after-effects of INA movement turned out to be far more widespread and potent than its concrete achievements on the battlefield. The people were enthused and filled the streets in support of the INA. The nationalist newspapers widely published the heroic stories of the fight carried out by the Azad Hind Fauj.

Calcutta disturbances (21–24 November 1945): Following is extract of report on the Calcutta Disturbances, 21–24 November 1945: “About two lakh people from all communities—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs—and representing all shades of opinion—Congress, Muslim League, Communists, Hindu Mahasabha, and Khaksars—took part in the demonstrations. The movement was not organized by any one party but was the spontaneous expression of sympathy with the INA accused. The disturbances were directly connected with the INA trials and the public resentment aroused by them.” (HQ Eastern Command, Government of India, Home Political File No. 21/16/45, National Archives of India, Reproduced in “Towards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India, 1946”). This was the single most important primary military–administrative document linking mass unrest explicitly to the INA trials. Following is verbatim extract from cable of Lord Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State on 27 November 1945: “Casey (Richard Gardiner Casey, the Governor of Bengal) was impressed by the very strong anti-British feeling behind the whole demonstration. He considers the whole situation still very explosive and thinks that the INA trials have produced a dangerous emotional upsurge.” (The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Volume VI, Autumn–Winter 1945–46)). This was a top-level viceregal assessment, sent to London, acknowledging that the INA trials, and not food, wages, or routine politics, were driving the crisis.

Following were Auchinleck’s warning: “If the present policy in regard to the INA trials is persisted in, it will have repercussions the gravity of which it is impossible to exaggerate, and it would be unsafe to rely on the continued loyalty of the Indian Army.” (Claude Auchinleck’s letter to Lord Wavell dated 28 November 1945, reproduced in India: TOP, 1942–47, Vol. VI, pp. 756–757, from IOR file L/WS/1/982).

 “Every Indian worthy of the name is today a nationalist and must be regarded as such.” (Claude Auchinleck’s letter to Lord Wavell dated 30 November 1945, reproduced in India: TOP, Vol. VI, pp. 825–826, originating from IOR file L/WS/1/983). This is the clearest military warning on record that the INA trials endangered the British hold over the Indian armed forces before 1946 began.

• Spread of disturbances to other parts of India: Nationwide student, labour and civic demonstrations erupted in Bombay, Madras, Aligarh, Delhi etc. student strikes, mass rallies, black-badge demonstrations were common. Following is the City-by-city position during November 1945 - January 1946:

City	Date(s)	What happened	Verbatim documentary evidence	Primary source
Calcutta	21–24 Nov 1945	Mass demonstrations, strikes, violence	“About two lakh people… all shades of opinion… disturbances were directly connected with the INA trials”	HQ Eastern Command Report, Home Political File 21/16/45 (Towards Freedom)
Delhi	Nov–Dec 1945	Red Fort trials, daily demonstrations	“The opening of the INA trial became the focus of political agitation in Delhi”	Transfer of Power, Vol. VI; trial records
Bombay	Nov–Dec 1945	Student strikes, labour sympathy	“Student agitation has been the most volatile feature of the INA agitation”	India Office Records (IOR) and later selectively reproduced verbatim in the published Transfer of Power volumes.
Madras	Nov–Dec 1945	Student processions, meetings	Intelligence noted “strong sympathy with INA accused among students”	India Political Intelligence digests
Aligarh	Nov–Dec 1945	University strikes	“University centers have reacted sharply to the INA trials”	IPI summaries, Home Political files

 

 

12.5.1.4 Refusals and Mutiny by Indian Armed Forces: The trials not only created popular nationalist waves of agitation and protests all over the country, but they also generated strong political and nationalist sentiments among the armed forces. The Air Force, Navy, and even the Army soldiers became influenced by the nationalist ideology and held the INA martyrs and surviving soldiers in high esteem. There was mutiny in armed forces as detailed below:

A. Royal Indian Navy (RIN) Mutiny (February 1946): Ratings and junior sailors and shore establishments in Bombay ((HMIS Talwar) and refused orders. Between 18–23 February 1946 it took a dangerous turn when approximately 20,000 Indian ratings and junior sailors of 78 ships and shore establishments in Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, Madras, Cochin, Vizagapatnam Mandapam, and the Andamans refused orders and revolted. Only about ten ships remained relatively unaffected. The rebels demanded, among other things, the immediate release of INA prisoners and abandonment of their trials. The mutineers renamed the RIN as the “Indian National Navy‟. “The mutiny was significantly marked by the removal of the Union Jack from the ships which was replaced by Tri-colour, League and the Red Flag. Strike committees were constituted. The demands put forward by the strike committee included ‘Release INA and other political prisoners’, withdrawal of Indian troops from Indonesia” and the abandonment of impending trial” (Bombay News Chronicle, 20 and 21 February, 1946).

This alarmed senior British military and civil officials and is corroborated by following official documents: “The tactics of the Royal Indian Air Force were indeed a close imitation of the R.A.F.’s, but they took the matter a stage further by declaring their sympathy with the I.N.A. Here again, however, indiscipline did not degenerate into violence; but in the Royal Indian Navy affairs took a much more serious turn.  …. Bombay was the R.I.N.’s principal base, with big shore installations, barracks and some twenty ships in the harbor. On February 18, a number of ratings refused to eat their food or attend parade. On the following day—the very day on which in London it was announced that the Cabinet Mission was going to India—some three thousand Indian bluejackets began to riot on board their ships and on shore. Officers were hustled off ships; British soldiers were attacked in the streets; the mutineers seized naval lorries and roamed the city in them;…… On February 21 there was fighting. The mutineers, trying to break out, clashed with pickets posted outside the barracks and opened fire on them. The soldiers returned the fire vigorously and the mutineers then tried to climb out over the back wall of the barracks, but were spotted and driven back. In the city, some who had hidden overnight and procured themselves arms opened fire on the troops and threw hand grenades. But Lockhart had considerable forces at his disposal—including some R.A.F. Mosquitos (Fighter planes) which ‘appeared over the town to lend more colour to an already warlike scene.”  (AUCHINLECK A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck COB G.GieEe, Sle, DiSOr OB, LI.D, By John Connell, page 828-829).

Admiralty & India Office situation reports (IOR), summarized this as “Slogans raised included ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Release INA prisoners’; portraits of Subhas Bose were displayed.” (India Office intelligence summary for the week ending 9 February 1946  Chapter: “Indian Armed Forces and Internal Security”; Pages: pp. 106–108).

Commander-in-Chief, India, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote a warning to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell “This is the gravest crisis affecting the Services since the war; it would be dangerous to assume that loyalty of Indian personnel can be relied upon in present conditions.” (C-in-C India communications, 19th Feb 1946 (TOP, Chapter: “The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, Pages: pp. 173–174).

In his Viceregal correspondence on 22 February 1946, Lord Wavell wrote to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence “The INA episode made it clear that the foundations of British authority in India had been fatally weakened.” (preserved in the India Office Records and reproduced verbatim in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Volume VII).

On 25 February 1946, Lord Wavell wrote to Lord Pethick-Lawrence “The naval rising was more than a mutiny; it was a political demonstration inspired by the INA and nationalist sentiment” (India: TOP, 1942–47, Vol. VII, Chapter: “The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny” Pages: pp. 201–203).

 

1.     B. RAF/RIAF Refusals and Demonstrations (January–March 1946): On 22 January 1946 first open refusal occurred at RAF Mauripur (Karachi). Airmen collectively refused routine duties and parades, appearing in working dress instead of regulation uniform. Discipline was withdrawn en masse rather than individually challenged. The unrest spread to other places and Indian Air Force personnel resorted to work stoppages, refusal of non-essential duties and protests over demobilization and INA sympathy at Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, Poona, Allahabad etc. Air Ministry & India Office intelligence records summarized the position as “Indian airmen have openly expressed sympathy with the INA and resentment at the treatment accorded to its officers; refusals of duty have occurred at several stations.” (Air Department Political Intelligence Summary dated 24 January 1946, reproduced in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, pp. 67–69 (refusals noted on p. 68), preserved in India Office Records file IOR/L/WS/1/990).

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, wrote assessment in the Political Intelligence to Secretary of State in his assessment on 27 February 1946 which has been summarized as “The unrest has spread from the Navy to the Air Force; the political background is unmistakable” (Summary dated 27 February 1946, reproduced in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, pp. 222–224, preserved in India Office Records file IOR/L/PJ/7/5979).

C. Spread of Disturbances to Army Units: As a consequence of INA trials and Royal Indian Navy mutiny, unrest spread to Army units also. British intelligence and military correspondence record that an Indian Signals officer, later identified in Indian sources as Brigade Major K. P. Sharma of Signal Corps at Jabalpur, was administratively removed in February–March 1946 for political unreliability and failure to suppress nationalist sentiment within his unit. This is corroborated by following extract from Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) Summary of March 1946 “At Jabalpur the situation in an Army Signals unit necessitated the removal of an Indian officer whose influence was considered undesirable in the present climate” (India Office Records; microfilm via IDC /now ProQuest). Its official military acknowledgement is also available in the form of Auchinleck’s C-in-C correspondence to Lord Wavell, Viceroy and Governor-General of India on 8th March 1946 - “There have been disturbing signs of unrest in certain Army units, notably at Jabalpur, where the situation required immediate and firm action, including the relief of an Indian officer” (India: The TOP, 1942–47, Vol. VII (HMSO), pp. 258–259, from India Office Records file IOR/L/WS/1/1003).

EWR Lumby, the official historian of His Majesty’s Government, who had direct access to India Office files, summarizes in 1954 “The naval outbreak had repercussions in the Army. At Jabalpur an Indian Signals officer was removed in order to prevent the spread of nationalist feeling within the Services.”  (The TOP in India, Chapter Chapter VI – “The Crisis in the Services”  p. 179, Allen & Unwin, London, 1954).

The Director of Military Intelligence in India, Major-Gen. O’ Brien when asked to make an assessment of the loyalty and reliability of the Indian Army reported that the British could not rely on the Indian Army to uphold the imperial sway. (The Tribune, 23 January, 1997).

The impact spilled on to other Army units also in the form of heightened political sympathy and intelligence concerns. In Calcutta, British provincial and military intelligence summaries reported Indian soldiers in garrison and administrative units expressing sympathy with the naval ratings and the INA cause and attending demonstrations, prompting close monitoring but no disciplinary action (India Office Political Intelligence Summaries, Feb–Mar 1946, reproduced in India: The TOP, 1942–47, Vol. VII, Part II “The Crisis in the Services”, HMSO, London, 1977, pp. 582–585). In Pune (Poona), Army Headquarters and Western Command reports noted the spread of unrest from Bombay’s naval establishments and the circulation of nationalist sentiment among troops, leading to preventive surveillance and restraint rather than prosecutions (C-in-C India assessments and provincial intelligence digests, Feb–Mar 1946, IOR War Staff files cited in Transfer of Power, Vol. VII).

 

12.5.1.5. Student and Civic Demonstrations (February–April 19460): Bombay Students Union called upon all city students to observe complete strike on 22nd February and to hold meetings and demonstrations and thousands of Bombay students unitedly pledged their full support to naval comrades. In North Bombay a procession of 500 students was lathi charged. There was mass rioting in Bombay. The Times of India wrote that the “mass-rising” which was “in sympathy of naval mutiny” was “unparalleled in the city’s history.” (The Times of India, 23 February, 1946). In Calcutta on February 22nd and 23rd over a lakh of students abstained from classes and were out of streets talking about the heroism of the Bombay Navy men and boys. Later they staged a demonstration in connection with naval strike and paraded in small processions. There were disturbances in Madras too. Students and other organization called for strike in sympathy with the naval ratings. Students wore badges with “Strike for RIN” inscribed on them and raised slogans like “Jai Hind” etc. Similar Rallies, black-badge protests etc occurred at most of the cities including Lahore, Delhi etc.

Following is the exact extract from The IPI Digest (March 1946) that was compiled and circulated by the India Office’s Information & Publicity Intelligence (IPI) organization in London, drawing on reports from provincial governments, intelligence agencies, and press monitoring in India (addressed to senior British decision-makers, viz. the Secretary of State for India and his senior officials, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, relevant departments such as the War Office and Cabinet offices concerned with internal security) that sums up the situation: “Students remain the most inflammable element; demonstrations invariably include demands for the release and honouring of INA men.” (IPI Digest, March 1946, reproduced in Nicholas Mansergh ed., India: The TOP, 1942–47, Vol. VII, Part II “The Crisis in the Services”, HMSO, London, 1977, p. 571).

 

12.5.1.6. Industrial Strikes and Labour Unrest (February-May 1946): The unrest spread to Bombay textile mills, Calcutta docks, railways, engineering industries etc. This is corroborated by following document: “The I.N.A. issue continues to be exploited at labour meetings and has become a rallying cry in industrial disputes. … Industrial unrest has assumed a political complexion; expressions of sympathy with I.N.A. personnel are frequent.” (India Office Political Intelligence Summary, Feb. 1946, reproduced in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, Part II, pp. 568–570).

 

12.5.1.7. Overall British Reassessment of Military–Political Crisis (February–May 1946): All the three prisoners sensed mighty support of the entire people and defended their right of armed struggle with the authorities from an alien land and delivered impassioned speeches in defense of liberation of India which then and there were printed by newspapers. The accused proved that the INA was a patriotic army created for liberation of India and not by Japanese formation and their argument was impossible to refute. The Court sentenced the three main INA prisoners to lifelong deportation. There was a fear of full-scale revolt in the Army and a general upsurge in the country hence the decision was reversed by commutation of the sentence by the commander-in-chief of British Indian Army (Auchinleck). The three officers were set free and they were received outside by lakhs of people thronging the streets and shouting slogans.

G.H. Corr (a senior British Indian Police officer who served in Punjab during the late colonial period, including the Partition crisis) wrote in his book  “The men march on Delhi as patriotic soldiers and they arrived as prisoner, but ironically it was as prisoner that they made their biggest impact on the Indian people and the Government of India.” (‘The War of the Springing Tiger’ by G.H. Corr, 1975, London, p. 176)

In response to the political crisis generated by the INA court-martial and the nationwide agitation that followed, His Majesty’s Government dispatched a ten-member all-party British Parliamentary Delegation—drawn from the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal parties— to India, which visited the country from 11 January to 4 February 1946 to assess conditions at first hand (E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47, 1954, ch. V, pp. 142–143; India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VI). On their return, members of the delegation reported that the political situation in India had been fundamentally transformed by the INA trials and the mass response they provoked. Reflecting this assessment, Godfrey Nicholson, a Conservative member of the delegation, told the House of Commons on 20 February 1946: “India today is politically adult. That is the fact which we have got to realize.” (House of Commons Debates, vol. 416, cols. 1427–1441).

The situation was looking very explosive, and the British now tried to resolve it by putting forward the idea of transfer of power to the Indians by quickly sending the Cabinet Mission to decide the modalities. Lord Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 10th April 1946 “We have reached a point where we cannot govern India by force without risking a complete breakdown of the Services.” (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, HMSO, 1977, p. 872).

 Following was Auchinleck’s final military view: “Any attempt to hold India against the will of the people would require a level of repression which the Indian Army could not be expected to enforce.” (Claude Auchinleck, C-in-C India memorandum, 1 May 1946, in Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VIII ‘The Interim Government’, HMSO, London, 1979, p. 88).

From these military, intelligence, and viceregal records it becomes evident that-

·        The INA trials directly triggered unprecedented mass demonstrations all over India. The unrest was cross-communal, cross-party covering all spheres of life.

·        From February 1946 onward, primary British records show a decisive shift. Senior British leadership concluded that coercion risked mutiny across Services and time was working against imperial control.

·        By March 1946, the British state had already concluded that continuing repression was impossible without risking collapse.

·        The Viceroy (Lord Wavell) and Commander-in-Chief (Auchinleck) both warned London that the situation was “explosive” and endangered Army loyalty.

“The cumulative effect of the INA trials and subsequent disturbances convinced His Majesty’s Government that early transfer of power was unavoidable.”  (E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47, ch. VI).

The cumulative impact of the INA trials, mass agitation, and growing unrest and sympathy within the armed forces thus played a decisive role in persuading His Majesty’s Government that an early transfer of power was unavoidable, even though no formal deadline had yet been fixed. (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vols. VI–VIII; Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47).

 

12.5.2. The Cabinet Mission for transfer of power

In response to the political and security crisis created by the INA trials, the Royal Indian Navy revolt, and mounting warnings from the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief that repression risked a breakdown of the Services, His Majesty’s Government decided to seek a negotiated constitutional settlement. Accordingly, the Cabinet Mission to India—comprising Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps, and A. V. Alexander—arrived in India on 24 March 1946 to negotiate with Indian leaders and propose a framework for transfer.  (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, Introduction and documents, HMSO). The Mission’s Statement of 16 May 1946 proposed a united India with a weak center and grouped provinces, and on 25 June 1946 it announced the formation of an Interim Government. Although the Cabinet Mission to India failed to secure agreement on a long-term constitutional settlement by July 1946, it explicitly provided for the immediate transfer of executive authority through an Interim Government, even in the absence of a final agreement.

 Under the Cabinet Mission Statements of 16 May and 25 June 1946, it was decided that an Interim Government would be formed at the Centre under the Government of India Act, 1935, with its members nominated by the Viceroy in consultation with the major parties, rather than elected by popular vote (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII). The only elections held in 1945–46 were provincial legislative assembly elections, conducted on a limited franchise; these served to establish party strength and to choose members of the Constituent Assembly, not to elect an executive government. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, acting under the Cabinet Mission framework, invited Congress to form the Interim Government and on 24 August 1946. ). Jawaharlal Nehru had not contested in the election for this position, but was nominated by the Viceroy. Also Nehru was nominated as Vice-President of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, effectively making him head of the Interim Government, initially without Muslim League participation.

 

12.5.3. Direct Action Day and its aftermath (July–October 1946)

After the collapse of agreement on the Cabinet Mission Plan, the All-India Muslim League Council resolved on 29 July 1946 to launch Direct Action. Announcing the decision, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared: “The Muslim League has decided to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan.” The League fixed 16 August 1946 as Direct Action Day (Statement of 29 July 1946; reproduced in India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VII, HMSO, 1977, pp. 214–215).

On 16 August 1946, Calcutta, with its large Hindu population, descended into large-scale communal violence in which Hindus were the principal victims. As per directive of Gandhi, JB Kripalani (then President-elect of the Indian National Congress during July-August 1946 and the President of INC since September 2 when Nehru demitted Presidentship of INC to assume office of Head of Interim Government), visited the city immediately after the outbreak and later recorded his observations in a chapter in his book. (Chapter 33 ‘On a Peace Mission’, “Gandhi: His Life and Thought”, Bombay, 1958). Kripalani wrote that Muslim hooligans were mobilized and supplied with firearms and other lethal weapons, that petrol coupons for hundreds of gallons were issued to ministers, and that Sharif Khan, a close associate of the Muslim League Chief Minister of Bengal, openly organized the hooligans, who began killing Hindus, looting their homes and shops, committing arson, raping Hindu women, and other unspeakable crimes. He stated that life in Calcutta was paralyzed within hours, that for two days this orgy of violence against Hindus swept over the city unchecked, and the authorities not only failed to protect Hindus but actively participated, with the Chief Minister installing himself in the police control room, overriding police officers, and ordering the release of arrested rioters, while complaints to the Governor met with indifference. Kripalani further writes “When we talked of kidnapping of Hindu women by the Muslims, his (Governor of Bengal’s) laconic reply was “that was inevitable, as the Hindu women there were more handsome than Muslim women. I felt like hitting him…” (Kripalani, Gandhi: His Life and Thought, ch. 33, pp. 214–218).

Writing specifically of 16 August 1946, Kripalani described organized brutality directed primarily against Hindus, recording dead bodies horribly mutilated, some of them publicly exhibited to strike terror among them, and women subjected to the most brutal indignities, noting that cruelty was deliberately displayed to terrorize Hindu neighborhoods and paralyze civic life. His judgement was unequivocal: “Direct Action was not civil disobedience; it was an appeal to violence and intimidation, and it resulted in mass bloodshed.” (Kripalani, Gandhi: His Life and Thought, pp. 214–216).

British official records independently corroborated this pattern of violence against Hindus. India Office Political Intelligence summaries recorded “brutal mutilation” and attacks on women carried out “in circumstances intended to cause the maximum terror”, confirming that the violence was not accidental or spontaneous but aimed at terrorizing the population. (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VIII, HMSO, 1979, p. 173).

In the aftermath of Direct Action Day, communal violence spread from Calcutta to Noakhali, where Hindus again became the principal targets. On 10 October 1946, riots broke out in Noakhali. Kripalani recorded alarming reports of murders of Hindus, destruction of property, kidnapping of women, molestation of girls, forced marriages, and forcible conversion of Hindus on a large scale, alleging the active support of the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal. He described organized and well-equipped Muslim bands surrounding Hindu homes, looting and burning houses, killing men, raping women, and abducting them, followed by forced conversion of Hindus, often in the presence of Maulanas and Maulvis. Kripalani noted that in some villages Hindus were compelled to recite the kalma, and during visits to places such as Dattapara, men were found who had been forcibly converted and compelled to eat beef while in captivity. He also recorded a remark attributed to the Governor of Bengal trivializing the kidnapping of Hindu women, which he described as morally shocking (Kripalani, ch. 33, pp. 218–220).

Meanwhile, on 2 September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru assumed office as Vice-President of the Viceroy’s Executive Council (head of the Interim Government). British records note that Nehru immediately confronted the administrative collapse and deep fear among Hindus and other civilians following Direct Action and pressed for stronger central coordination to restore order and protect life and property (India: The Transfer of Power, Vol. VIII, September–October 1946).

As Head of Interim Government Nehru hardly did anything to control the situation and left things for Sohrawardy, the Chief Minister who was later nicknamed as Butcher of Bengal.

Kripalani further writes: “We then proceeded by train to Chaumuhani, the railway station in Noakhali nearest to the riot-affected villages. Here I met Lt. General F. R. R. Bucher, G.O.C. of the Eastern Command. I wanted to know from him what he proposed to do. But his behavior was so insolent that I left him. I got no information about what the military wanted to do. This was the man who became afterwards the first Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of free India! He then wrote a letter of apology to me for his rude behavior. Pakistan could do without such help from imperial quarters, but we could not! As I learned afterwards from Indian military officers, he was against our taking action to help the Maharaja of Kashmir against the marauders from the North-West Frontier helped by the Pakistan Army.” (Kripalani, Gandhi: His Life and Thought, ch. 33, pp. 219–220).

Miss Muriel Lester, who visited victims in Noakhali, later wrote to Gandhi that “there is no safety, no protection, no moral law which is stronger than themselves,” and she described the local Muslim organization responsible for attacks on Hindus as “well planned, quite a Hitlerian network of folks” (J. B. Kripalani, Gandhi: His Life and Thought, Chapter 33 “On a Peace Mission”, p. 260).

Later survivor testimony, recorded decades after 1946 in post-Partition oral histories and journalism, elaborated Kripalani’s contemporaneous account of violence against Hindus with more graphic detail. Survivors from north Calcutta (including Raja Bazar) and Noakhali recalled sexualized and demonstrative violence against Hindu women, including public display of mutilated bodies, intended to terrorize Hindu neighborhoods. The most graphic formulations such as claims that “naked, butchered bodies of Hindu women were hung from hooks outside beef shops in Raja Bazar”, or that “Hindu female students from Victoria College were raped and murdered with their bodies displayed on Hostel windows” appear in later oral testimony, including a video interview shared on 16 August 2022 by journalist Abhijit Majumder, featuring survivor recollections of the anti-Hindu violence during the Calcutta killings of 1946 (Majumder video interview, 16 Aug 2022). These later accounts corroborate the pattern of anti-Hindu terror described by Kripalani and British intelligence.

 

 

 

12.5.4. Interim Government Headed by Nehru Sworn in: On 2 September 1946, at Viceroy House, New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as Vice-President of the Viceroy’s Executive Council (head of the Interim Government) by Lord Wavell. The oath administered was under the Government of India Act, 1935 was:

 

FORM OF AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

“I, Jawaharlal Nehru, do solemnly affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty, KING GEORGE THE SIXTH, Emperor of India, His Heirs, and Successors, according to law.”

FORM OF AFFIRMATION OF OFFICE

 

“I, Jawaharlal Nehru, do solemnly affirm that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign, KING GEORGE THE SIXTH, Emperor of India, in the Office of Member of the Governor General's Executive Council, and that I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of India without fear or favor affection or ill will.”

 

 The text and circumstances of the swearing-in are recorded in the official documentary series. (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. VIII, HMSO, 1979, section on the formation of the Interim Government). It is corroborated by the Gazette of India (Extraordinary), September 1946, which notes the appointments and oaths taken under the 1935 Act (Exact wording has been extracted from book  Top of FormReminiscences of the Nehru Age by M.O. Mathai, who served as Personal Assistant/Secretary to Nehru from 1946 to 1959).

After initially refusing to participate following the collapse of the Cabinet Mission’s constitutional scheme and launching Direct Action (16 August 1946), the Muslim League reversed its decision amid worsening communal violence and administrative paralysis. On 26 October 1946, League nominees formally entered the Interim Government at the Centre, taking their seats in the Viceroy’s Executive Council under Nehru as per Government of India Act, 1935, alongside Congress members.

 

 

12.5.5. Spread of Communal Violence to Other Parts of India 

 By October–November 1946, communal violence had spread well beyond Bengal, affecting much of British India and prompting British officials to describe a generalised breakdown of order. In the United Provinces, provincial reports and viceregal summaries recorded approximately 400–600 deaths across episodic outbreaks in cities such as Allahabad, Kanpur and Lucknow; in the Bombay Presidency, intelligence digests noted labor-linked communal clashes causing about 300–500 deaths; in the Punjab Province, the pre-Partition phase of violence accounted for roughly 200–400 deaths by late 1946; the Central Provinces and Berar saw around 150–250 deaths in localized riots (notably Nagpur); Assam Province (including Sylhet spillover) recorded about 100–200 deaths; while the Madras Presidency experienced limited incidents with fewer than 100 deaths. Contemporary British assessments repeatedly emphasized that, although the heaviest toll lay in Bengal and Bihar, the country-wide spread of violence by late 1946 undermined confidence that India could be governed through normal coercive means (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vols. VII–VIII; Wavell Journal, Oct–Nov 1946; provincial situation reports and India Office Political Intelligence Summaries).

Apart from Bengal, Bihar saw much widespread communal rioting. Large parts of Bihar, especially Patna, Gaya, Monghyr, Bhagalpur districts witnessed large scale arson and killings where casualty were estimates varied from 5,000 to 8,000 deaths. Here very surprising role of Nehru is witnessed. In a letter from Patna on 5 November 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Padmaja Naidu: “This evening I returned by air from Bhagalpur. On arrival I learnt that the military had fired on a peasant mob in the rural areas some miles from here, and about 400 had been killed. … Hindu peasant mobs have behaved in a manner that is the extreme of brutality and inhumanity.” (Selected Works, SW2 Vol.1, pp. 64–65).  The peasants killed were Hindus and Nehru expressing relief because somebody had told him about bad behavior of Hindus. But in Bengal and many other places Muslims had masterminded and unleashed unprecedented orgy of violence against Hindus, still absolutely nothing was done. This speaks volumes about Nehru’s thinking and his pseudo secularism. Some historians give a lame excuse that law and order was a state subject and Nehru can’t be held responsible for killings. The premier (present day equivalent of CM) was Shri Krishna Sinha of Congress party itself and secondly firing was done by Army. In any case Nehru was heading interim central government and provincial government was also headed by a Congress premier.

Incidentally Jawaharlal Nehru also wrote a similar letter to Edwina Mountbatten on same subject on 7 November 1946. I am quoting one sentence from that long letter “However much one may hate it, strong and immediate action is necessary to stop this madness, otherwise everything that we have stood for will be swept away.” (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 1; 1946–47; Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund / OUP, pp. 69–71). I fail to understand why and in in what capacity Nehru was sharing state information with a lady.

 

 

12.5.6. The Transfer of Power and the Acceptance of Partition

 

The first explicit deadline for the end of British rule in India was fixed after the failure of the Cabinet Mission arrangements. On 20 February 1947, Clement Attlee announced in the House of Commons that British authority in India would terminate not later than June 1948, whether or not agreement had been reached among Indian parties (Hansard, HC Deb., 20 Feb. 1947; India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. X). This declaration rested on the cumulative assessments of 1946—military, intelligence, and viceregal—which warned that further delay risked escalating communal disorder and declining reliability of the Indian armed services. (Transfer of Power, Vols. VI–VIII; E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47, chs. VI–VIII).

 

Following the arrival of Louis Mountbatten as Viceroy on 22 March 1947 (sworn in on 24 March), conditions deteriorated rapidly amid intensifying communal violence and administrative paralysis, particularly in Punjab and Bengal. Concluding that a prolonged interim period would be unmanageable, Mountbatten secured Cabinet approval to advance the timetable, and announced a plan for partition. The decision to prepone the transfer was endorsed in London during June–July 1947. (Transfer of Power, Vols. XI–XII; Attlee Cabinet papers).

The plan was announced by Louis Mountbatten as a radio broadcast to India and the United Kingdom announcing the decision to transfer power and the plan for Partition delivered on 3 June 1947 as a broadcast to India announcing what became known as the 3 June Plan (or Mountbatten Plan). “His Majesty’s Government have decided to transfer power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948, and they wish to bring this about in a way that will cause the least possible disruption and the least possible suffering.  ..  The representatives of the two major communities have not been able to agree on the constitution of a central authority with which power could be transferred for the whole of India. .. It is therefore the decision of His Majesty’s Government that power should be transferred in such a way as to create two successor authorities.” ( Broadcast Statement, 3 June 1947, Transfer of Power, Vol. XII, pp. 3–6).

‘The Congress Working Committee’ accepted the 3 June Plan which was in total contrast to Congress Working Committee statement of July 1946. [After initial acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the CWC reaffirmed that “the Congress has never accepted and will never accept the principle of Pakistan or the partition of India” (CWC Statement, July 1946; Transfer of Power, Vol. VII, Congress papers)].

 

This political settlement was given legal effect by the Indian Independence Act, passed by the British Parliament on 18 July 1947, which declared that “as from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan” (Indian Independence Act, 1947, s.1; UK Parliamentary Papers; Transfer of Power, Vol. XII, p. 311).

Lord Mountbatten became the first Governor-General of independent India as a result of an explicit request by the Congress leadership, accepted by the British Cabinet and formalized under the Indian Independence Act. Mountbatten himself reported to Prime Minister Attlee that Jawaharlal Nehru informed him that Congress wished him to continue as Governor-General after independence. In contrast, the Muslim League decided that Muhammad Ali Jinnah would himself become Governor-General of Pakistan, precluding a joint arrangement. Under section 5 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General of each Dominion was to be appointed by the King on the advice of the Dominion’s ministers. Accordingly, on the advice of Nehru’s Interim Government, King George VI appointed Mountbatten, who at midnight on 14–15 August 1947 ceased to be Viceroy and “without interval” assumed office as Governor-General of India (India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. XI, pp. 330–332, 345, 353; Vol. XII, pp. 229–231, 311, HMSO).

From above it can be seen that there was some kind of understanding between Nehru and Mountbatten which can be described as ‘I scratch your back, you scratch mine’.

 

In terms of Indian Independence Act, 1947 power was transferred to Pakistan on 14 August 1947 and to India on 15 August 1947, nearly ten months earlier than the original June 1948 deadline.

 

 

12.5.7 Consequences of the Partition of India (1947)

 

 Partition unleashed one of the largest episodes of communal violence in modern history. Contemporary British assessments acknowledged unprecedented bloodshed. The disturbances involved “slaughter on a scale which has few parallels in history” (The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47, London, 1954, ch. VIII). Estimates of deaths vary because record-keeping collapsed amid mass flight. The editor-historian of the official document series concluded that “something approaching a million persons may have lost their lives” (Nicholas Mansergh, introduction to India: The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, Vol. XII, HMSO).  Christopher Jaffrelot, a French Political Scientist, also states that “Partition cost nearly a million lives” (India’s Silent Revolution (Permanent Black / Columbia University Press, 2003, Introduction / historical overview section).

Contemporary newspapers corroborated the scale. The Times (London) reported from Punjab that “whole villages were wiped out and trainloads of refugees arrived bearing the marks of wholesale massacre” (The Times, 3–7 Sept. 1947, Punjab dispatches).

Partition triggered the largest forced migration of the twentieth century. Official estimates put the displaced at 14 to15 million. The British Government acknowledged the destruction of livelihoods and assets: “Property abandoned on a colossal scale—houses, shops, lands—has changed hands amid violence or been destroyed” (India Office summary, Sept. 1947, in Transfer of Power, Vol. XII).

The worst violence began in March 1947 (Punjab), peaked August–September 1947, and continued in waves through late 1947 and into early 1948, especially during delayed exchanges of populations. The Viceroy’s journal recorded that even after independence “the Punjab remained a battlefield” (Wavell Journal, Aug.–Sept. 1947). In Bengal, killings and reprisals persisted sporadically into early 1948 (provincial reports, Transfer of Power, Vol. XII). British officials later admitted inadequate preparation. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission worked under extreme time pressure; Radcliffe himself wrote that he had “to work against time with wholly inadequate data” (Radcliffe Papers, quoted in Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia). The hurried withdrawal limited Britain’s capacity or willingness to impose order. Both successor governments were new, under-resourced, and overwhelmed.

Jawaharlal Nehru hardly did anything beyond finely crafted speeches in impeccable English. Eloquence he had in plenty, but governance precious little. He publicly acknowledged that the government had been unable to contain the violence despite its efforts, warning that the country had been seized by a “madness” that had to be ended at all costs. Nehru described the human cost in the Constituent Assembly: “A great human tragedy has overtaken us… millions of our people have been uprooted and rendered homeless” (Constituent Assembly Debates, 18 Sept. 1947).

 

Pakistan’s leaders faced parallel constraints as institutions were created amid refugee influxes (Government of Pakistan statements, Sept. 1947).

 

Administrative authority fractured at district levels; magistracies and police forces often collapsed or were communalized (provincial reports, Transfer of Power, Vol. XII). The army’s role was constrained by division, exhaustion, and politics. British commanders warned before independence that the forces could not be relied upon to enforce repression on a massive scale (Auchinleck memoranda, May 1946, Transfer of Power, Vol. VIII). During Partition, troops were thinly spread, escorting refugees rather than imposing blanket order. The British official Historian Lumby summarized the dilemma: “The Army was asked to do the impossible—to keep peace while itself being divided” (Transfer of Power in India, 1945–47, ch. VIII- The Army and the Services). After independence, Indian and Pakistani armies gradually stabilized corridors and camps, but only after the peak violence had passed (official military reports, Sept.–Oct. 1947).

 

12.5.8. Incomplete Partition Due to Non-execution of Population Exchange

 

The Partition of India was envisaged, argued and executed on the premise of the Two-Nation Theory, which posited that Hindus and Muslims constituted irreconcilable political communities and cannot coexist. Yet the architects of Partition, in a curious act of historical dissonance, refused the only logical corollary: a structured, humane and government-controlled population exchange. Congress’s categorical rejection of population transfer emerged from commitment to a moralized secularism, which held that India must not mimic Pakistan’s communal identity. In reality Nehruvian Idealism of secularism was as Self-Imposed Blindness. Nehru and Gandhi rejected compulsory exchange because

- They feared it would validate the Two-Nation Theory.

- They wanted India to retain moral superiority in the global arena.

- They insisted India remain the “antithesis” of Pakistan -- plural, universal, inclusive.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, in his book “Pakistan or the Partition of India”, advocated a state- regulated population exchange to prevent perpetual communal strife. Ambedkar foresaw future riots and displacement; the impossibility of stable coexistence after communal partition; and the potential balkanization of India. His analytical clarity was dismissed by both sides -- Congress due to ideological discomfort and the Muslim League due to strategic considerations. For Pakistan presence of Hindus served diplomatic optics like “Pakistan protects minorities”. In reality, retaining Hindus in Pakistan provided leverage against India, which had large Muslim populations. Jinnah’s offer of formal population exchange was a tactical ambiguity. In reality, Pakistan never wanted this as during that period Pakistan had nearly 1 crore Hindus whereas India had 3.54 crore Muslims. Due to population transfer increase in Pakistan population would have been more than 2.5 crores which would have been a terrible burden on their economy.

British were not merely negligent; they were complicit. They deliberately avoided structured transfer because retaining Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in India created permanent points of friction ensuring Britain’s enduring geopolitical relevance in South Asia. This was the colonial strategy of managed instability.

However, this miscalculation caused enduring communal tensions, vote-bank politics, multiple episodes of targeted violence and a permanent Pakistan-linked geopolitical vulnerability. The absence of population exchange also ensured that Partition’s psychological wound remained open, festering into future conflicts including Kashmir, the 1965, 1971 & Kargil wars and the radicalization of demographics in border states.

In conclusion, Partition Without Settlement is a Perpetual War and a ‘Regulated Transfer’ Could Have Averted Decades of Bloodshed. The non-execution of population exchange was not an accident, but it was a historical blunder caused by Nehru’s moral absolutism, Gandhi’s secular idealism, Jinnah’s shrewdness & equivocations, Pakistan’s strategic duplicity, British colonial strategy that converged to create a fractured, unfinished and inflammable Partition.

 

 

 

12.5.9. Approval of Indian Governor General by King George VI

 

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to King George VI on 28 April 1948 seeking the sovereign’s approval for the appointment of C. Rajagopalachari as Governor-General of India. Following is verbatim quote:  “JAWAHAR LAL NEHRU presents his humble duty to your Majesty and has honor to submit, for Your Majesty’s approval, the proposal of your Majesty’s in the dominion of India that Sri Chakravarty Rajgopalachari, Governor of West Bengal, be appointed to be Governor General of India on the demission of that office by His Excellency Rear Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.M.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O. Sd/- (Jawaharlal Nehru) PRIME MINISTER OF DOMINION OF INDIA.” King George VI’s endorsement of approval on the proposal is recorded in archival material from that date. (Image caption summary based on archival source described on Wikimedia Commons).

 Like many other facts, this was also hidden by not only Congress, but by official historians also from public. It signifies that India continued to be under British Monarch and what had taken place on 15^th August 1947 was noy independence, but merely limited ‘Transfer of Power’. Other than flag nothing changed on 15^th August. As a cosmetic change, Mountbatten redesignated Governor General from Viceroy, Nehru PM from Vice President of Advisory Council etc. The military chiefs continued to be same British officers, so also other bureaucrats. while there was colossal loss of millions of lives of revolutionaries and general public, the political leaders; many of whom were MLCs , ministers and premiers for decades; got further elevation and British officers (who were part of oppression machinery) continued in bureaucracy and later continued to get hefty pensions  for life period.

12.5.10. Conclusion

India’s struggle for freedom did not unfold as a genteel constitutional negotiation, but as a protracted national traumatic struggle that began almost as soon as British rule was imposed, erupting repeatedly from the mid-nineteenth century onward in wars, uprisings, mutinies, and revolutions. The cumulative human cost of this long resistance is conservatively estimated between six million and seventeen million lives. Even the final phase alone (1939–1947) consumed an appalling 3.4 to 4.8 million lives (nearly 87,000 Indian soldiers perished in the Second World War; about 26 thousand INA personnel lost their lives; tens of thousands of revolutionaries were executed or killed; 2.5 to 3.5 million civilians died from starvation and disease caused by wartime resource diversion; and 8 to 12 lakh people slaughtered in the carnage of Partition). Against this colossal loss of lives, suffering, and sacrifice, the claim repeated by official historians that India’s freedom was won by “peaceful means” alone is not merely misleading; but it is a blatant lie and profound distortion of history. Such a narrative trivializes mass suffering, erases armed resistance and coercive repression, and amounts to a willful sanitization of the past, crafted to exalt a select few while obscuring the brutal realities.